Interviews on Incel Identity and Radicalisation

Further Research and pedagogical concepts needed for P/CVE practice

By Benedikt Büchsenschütz

Introduction

In recent years, a disturbing trend has emerged with a series of attacks carried out by individuals identifying themselves as incels. These acts of physical violence, however, are not the only concerning aspect associated with the incel subculture. Proliferation of digital violence against women by incels has also become a growing threat (Hoffman, Ware, and Shapiro 2020, 565; Kaiser 2020, 79). Incel subculture propagates a deeply misogynistic and hateful ideology that partly legitimises and promotes violence (Baele, Brace, and Coan 2021, 1667; Kaiser 2020, 32). The term incel stands for the self-described status as involuntary celibate, the description of the state is called inceldom. Within the digital landscape, the incel community finds its place within the broader manosphere, a loosely connected network of online communities that primarily focus on misogyny (Kaiser 2020).

The emergence of the incel movement poses new challenges to the research field and practitioners: their interactions are largely happening in online spaces which makes it difficult to reach its members for any type of intervention. Furthermore, their ideology is incoherent and often closely connected to the individual mental health challenges posed to their respective followers. This text aims to contextualise the emerging threat, pinpoint the need for further research in this matter and propose practitioners’ interventions that might address it. Utilising findings from three narrative interviews held with individuals identifying as involuntary celibate.

Existing research on incels has unveiled the inherent ambiguity of the digital subculture (Hoffman, Ware, and Shapiro 2020, 566; Baele, Brace, and Coan 2021, 1667). Incels exhibit varying opinions and propensities for violence, with some expressing personal grievances and refraining from physical violence, while others actively incite and commit violence. However, research on incels is still in its early stages, and there remains a significant scarcity of data. A comprehensive framework or typology to differentiate within the incel community between streams that support violence and participate in hate speech and those who share grievances is yet to be developed, as this is a relatively new research subject. While recognising the lack of comprehensive data, there is a consensus among researchers that the incel movement poses a genuine threat to the safety and well-being of women and the general public (Hoffman, Ware, and Shapiro 2020, 565). With the aim of supporting the development strategies to prevent people from identifying with the inceldom and to develop a deeper understanding of the phenomenon, this text summarises the insights gained from three narrative interviews which have been conducted with individuals belonging to the subculture[1]. The overarching goal of this small-scale study was to test whether existing theories from radicalisation studies can be used to explain this relatively new phenomenon. Before delving into the results of the interviews conducted for this text, the relationship between inceldom and (violent) extremism needs to be discussed to fully understand and contextualise the resulting implications of the interviews – starting with the examination of the concept of extremism and how it relates to inceldom.

Inceldom and its relation to (violent) extremism

The incel ideology is rooted in a dichotomy that delineates a distinction between incels as an in-group and archetypes such as Normies, Femoids, and Chads and moreas the perceived external out-group (Baele, Brace, and Coan 2021, 1682). This consensus revolves around the notion that genetic and socio-economic disposition significantly shapes their living conditions and social status, thereby constructing the formation of in-groups and incel identity (Van Brunt and Taylor 2020, 129). The ideology appears to give individuals the ‘possibility’ to explain and categorise any (potentially poor) social circumstances as well as one’s personal situation (ibid).

Misogynistic attitudes towards women are manifested within the incel identity and ideology and are inseparable from it. The out-group is portrayed as the enemy who purposefully ‘structured society’ against incels to exclude them from romantic and/or sexual relationships by being superficial. Through this notion, incels perceive themselves as victims (Van Brunt and Taylor 2020, 29). Women are dehumanised in the language and discourses of incels, while being scapegoated and declared enemies who are to blame for the situation of incels, which promotes discourses glorifying violence (Lindsay 2022, 212; O’Malley, Holt, and Holt 2022, 12). The positive evaluation and justification of incel attacks as acts of revenge, in combination with the martyrisation of perpetrators as Saints or supreme gentlemen, can be considered as extremist (Kaiser 2020, 52; 2020, 63; 2020, 82; Witt 2020, 682). Violence against the out-group is discursively portrayed as a necessity to protect the in-group against the hostile environment that threatens them (Berger 2018, 75–76). The terminology around carrying out attacks (e.g., going ER)[2] opens the possibility of joining the ranks of the Saints, which can make assassinations attractive to people who are fame-seeking (ibid). Furthermore, the frequent occurrence of explicit endorsements of violence, particularly rape and murder of women underscore the threat potential from incel forums and discourses. These discourses are adaptable and overlap with extreme-right ideologies, which can make them even more harmful (Kaiser 2020, 72–74).

Besides traits of the ideology that target the out-group, narratives like the black pill theory[3] are particularly harmful to its adherents. The notion that incels are destined to live their whole life without romantic and/or sexual relationships can further strengthen mental health issues and possibly make their followers more open to pro-suicide discourses (Baele, Brace, and Coan 2021, 1686). Much of the ideology and its terminology is built around self-humiliation. Degrading terms like subhuman or beta serve as expressions for the assumed own inadequacy.

While the hateful discourses should not be underestimated in their potential for harm, both to incels themselves, as well as the targets of their hate, it has to be noted that many followers also use incel forums to express their pain and experienced rejection and do not agree with the endorsement of violence and explicit misogyny (Moskalenko et al. 2022a;Moskalenko et al. 2022b). For instance, in Whittaker’s (2024) study of 561 participants, almost three-quarters reported that they ‚rarely“ or ’never‘ justified violence against those they felt had harmed them, with only about 5% indicating ‚often.‘ Pathway analyses showed that mental health and ideology were stronger predictors of harm-related attitudes than community connectedness. Among the participants who often justified violence, common traits included higher levels of misogyny, feelings of marginalisation, and poorer mental health (Whittaker 2024, 24-26). Consistent with these findings, Speckhard et al. in an earlier study (2021) directly surveyed 271 incels about their attitudes toward violence. They found that a significant proportion (46.3%) disagreed with the statement, ‚Incels are willing to support violence,‘ while 8% agreed. Additionally, 7% expressed admiration for Elliot Rodger’s attack, while 26.1% admitted to occasionally entertaining violent thoughts toward others, and 20.6% expressed some level of agreement with the statement, ‚I would rape if I could get away with it‘ (Speckhard et al. 2021: 100, 106). Notably, self-reported dangerousness was strongly correlated with statements suggesting that the forum increased participants‘ feelings of violence (Speckhard et al. 2021: 103). Moskalenko et al. (2022a) conducted a survey of 274 participants and reported similar findings, though with relatively low levels of self-perceived dangerousness tied to incel identity (mean of 1.67 on a Likert scale).[4] Although support for violence and sexual assault was relatively low, the majority in both studies expressed agreement with core incel narratives. In Speckhard’s study, 87.5% affirmed belief in the ‚black pill‘ theory, while in Moskalenko’s study, agreement reached a mean of 3.59 on the Likert scale (Speckhard et al. 2021: 98; Moskalenko et al. 2022a: 13). The findings reveal a complex spectrum within the incel community, with the majority rejecting violence but a notable minority displaying harmful attitudes closely linked to feelings of marginalisation, misogyny, and poorer mental health. Based on the existing studies Sofia Moskalenko (2022a) concluded that „Classifying Incels as a terrorist group based on the action of a tiny minority among them might do more damage than it would protect the society” (Moskalenko 2022a, 20).

And yet, researchers like O’Malley, Holt and Holt (2022) and Whittaker (2024) argue that the incel ideology and its narratives are constituted like the ideologies of other extremist groups, with the difference of its concentration on the difficulty to have sex or a romantic relationship and assess the incel subculture as ‘inherently dangerous’ (O’Malley, Holt, and Holt 2022; Whittaker 2024 8). In addition, violence is not a necessary requirement for a movement or ideology to be considered extremist (see Schmid 2014). Lindsay (2022) similarly concludes that the incel ideology has traits of an extremist worldview and could promote terrorism (Lindsay 2022, 211–12). Baele, Brace and Coan (2019) agree, acknowledging the ambiguity of discourses within the incel subculture, but concluding that the incel worldview can promote violence against people who represent the constructed out-group of Incels (Baele, Brace, and Coan 2021, 1686). However, this assessment goes hand in hand with the indication that not all incels participate in discourses glorifying violence and, in some cases, use the forums merely to escape their loneliness and share their own grievances. The ideology is certainly destructive in both directions and contains a vast range of pro-suicide discourses. Furthermore, it should be noted that ideology is rarely the only decisive factor for the execution of violent actions (Borum 2011, 30). Ideology serves as a point of reference though, allowing individuals to link their individual experiences to it (Berger 2018, 133–34).

Results from the interviews

The interviews highlighted five main themes that are also prevalent in literature on radicalisation. In summary, participants exhibit varying degrees of radicalisation influenced by factors such as unfulfilled expectations in romantic and sexual relationships; experiences of exclusion; trauma; and exposure to extremist ideologies in incel forums. These ideologies make real life experiences explainable for its adherents as they offer explanations for their insecurities and negative experiences, that shift the blame to women, other men and societal structures. The following sections explains some of the main findings from the interview sample.

Biographies and potential risk factors for radicalisation

Interview Partner 1 attributed his incel identity primarily to the fact that his expectations of experiencing sexual intercourse, having a romantic relationship, and finding love were not met. He expressed a deep desire for a loving relationship, but his feelings were overshadowed by disappointment, bitterness, and jealousy towards those who already had such connections. Constantly experiencing rejection and even being mocked for his virginity by a woman further fuelled his self-doubt. Interview partner 1 carries a sense of shame for not having much sexual experience or a romantic relationship. He believes that at his age it would be normal to have had such experiences. He described that these unfulfilled expectations had a profound impact on his self-esteem and led to significant self-doubt and mental health challenges.

However, he rejects incels who would hate women and condone violence against women. He said that he once registered at incels.is but found that the people on the platform would be ‚insane‘ and thus left the forum immediately. To share his grievances and experiences he would rather spend time on Reddit forums. The framework of radicalisation, as described above, does not apply to him; he did not share any ideological views of the incel ideology and does not participate in forums because of the extreme discourses. Although he made statements that fit into the code of struggling with mental health and social isolation, these seem to be the result of his disappointment in not having found love and romantic relationships. He described his family as well situated and the relationship with his parents and brother as good. The risk factors applied to him only to a limited extent and he cannot be described as radicalised.

The second interview partner’s statements encompassed all the codes, painting a picture familiar to existing research findings on radicalisation. He described deeply troubling experiences, revealing a history of physical abuse from his father and enduring bullying and violence at school. Not only did women target him with bullying, but they also mocked his appearance, race, and height. In addition to the social isolation, he experienced racism and marginalisation which further compounded his feelings of isolation in school. Interviewee 2 expressed a profound sense of loneliness, lacking any friends or social connections. While he acknowledged achieving a good income, he stated he came from a ‘shithole,’ which may have contributed to his insecurities about his identity and self-worth.

All the aspects described above are known from research on radicalisation as being frequent characteristics at the individual level (Srowig et al. 2018, 6:73–78; Beelmann 2022, 159–60; Logvinov 2021, 28; Abbas 2019). Experiences of marginalisation and humiliation may lead to a perceived loss of individual significance and trigger identity crises (Beelmann 2019, 191; Zick and Böckler 2015, 7). As a result, Interviewee 2 developed a general distrust of others, seeing them as cruel and shallow. Through his encounter with the incel community on Reddit, he was exposed to the black pill theory, which he strongly identifies with, believing it to be an undeniable reality. It is possible to surmise that exposure to the ideology and incel community reinforced his worldview. Interview Partner 2 operates in radical milieus and represents a worldview that corresponds to the definition of radicalisation. He stated at one point in the interview:

I’m not promoting or whatever, but I can understand any male who commits mass shooting because they giva up on life. (Interview partner 2)

In his case, the risk factors known from the research offered explanations to the turn to incel identity.

Interview Partner 3 also made statements consistent with all codes. He had a difficult upbringing, growing up with his grandparents after his parents separated. His mother was only 17 when she gave birth to him. His father was absent since his childhood, and his relationship with his mother is perfunctory. The family conditions he grew up in were poor, leaving him with limited opportunities for higher education, let alone access to mental health support. He suffers from a speech impediment since childhood, because of which he was bullied and ostracised, yet he also did not have access to language training. Furthermore, he reported bullying experiences during his school years. He encountered the incel community and the black pill theory on Reddit which, he said, confirmed his pre-existing suspicions about how society is structured. Similarly, in his case, the established risk factors applied. Furthermore, he perceived himself as a victim of his genetics and circumstances. In sum, Interviewee 3’s radicalisation can be described as the possible result of a combination of an unsafe family environment, experiences of marginalisation and bullying, and social deprivation that isolated him from his peers. These factors possibly contributed to his adoption of the incel identity and his perception of the ideology as coherent. He understood the incel ideology as a ‚convincing philosophy’which should become part of the public discourse.

Radicalised versus non-radicalised inceldom

The results from the interviews indicate that individuals who adopt an incel identity have likely experienced challenges, such as bullying, facing insecure family relationships, social isolation, and struggles with mental health issues. These factors align with the identified risk factors of research on radicalisation. How useful these risk factors can be in explaining different paths of radicalisation with regard to incels is exemplified when looking at the case of Interview Partner 1 – whose risk factors are less pronounced compared to the other interviewees – and who interprets his incel identity differently. For him, identifying as an incel is a status that describes not having sex as much as he would like. As this interpretation of incel identity cannot be deemed extreme, a distinction between radicalised and non-radicalised adherents to the incel ideology should be made.

In contrast, interview Partners 2 and 3 – who showed strong manifestation and clear coherences among all risk factors – described an ideologised extremist identity, as they perceived their state of existence as destined, referring to the black pill theory. Both interview partners were active in incel forums and made statements which justified violence. Furthermore, both stated they understood men who committed violent attacks but would not promote them themselves. In addition, they downplayed amok discourses in incel forums and described them as an understandable result of the living situation in which incels find themselves. Therefore, both interviewees convey the established definition of radicalisation, by holding extremist and radical views.

Consequently, these findings provide a starting point for possible future research that investigates the relationship between the prevalence of individual risk factors and the degree of radicalisation of incels in more detail.

The analysis also revealed the ambiguity and the extreme aspects of the incel ideology. Interviewees 2 and 3 perceived society and so-called ‘normal’ individuals as an out-group, leading them to believe that society would gaslight incels and fail to grasp their perspective. The extreme nature of the ideology became apparent when interviewees expressed an understanding of amok attacks, even if they did not actively endorse them. Interview Partner 2 made statements in which he recommended suicide to certain individuals. Both interviewees maintained a view of women that aligned with incel ideology, although they stressed that they did not hate women. The assessment of the ideology as potentially extremist was validated by these findings. It is worth highlighting again that incel ideologies can also exacerbate self-destructive tendencies among its adherents.

For example, Interview Partner 3 expressed that he would probably commit suicide before his 25th birthday. Additionally, both referred to themselves in a self-humiliating manner, describing themselves as ugly and subhumans. The black pill theory appears to have a strong appeal to the interview partners who corresponded with the established risk factors, as it provides a framework for interpreting and explaining their traumatic experiences. Adopting the black pill theory and identifying as an incel might facilitate a sense of belonging to a group that they miss in their offline life. Further studies should examine how the incel ideology resonates with individuals to pull them into the incel sphere.

Incel forums as radical milieus

All interview partners first encountered incel content via Reddit and then moved on to closed incel forums. The anonymous nature of incel forums, facilitated by their online accessibility, provides an opportunity for individuals who are socially isolated and subject to social exclusion to engage and participate with others who share the same experiences (Brzuszkiewicz 2020, 15–16; Ohlrogge and Selck 2021, 52).

While Interview Partner 1 rejected them and left the forum immediately, Interview Partners 2 and 3 interact with them. The assessment of these forums as radical milieus appears to be useful; the interviewees who participate in these forums pursue their own interpretations of incel ideology and perceive the discourses on violence and suicide as normal and comprehensible (Leuschner 2023, 44; Fielitz, Schwarz, and Quent 2022, 136–38). The framework is able to capture the diverse discourses and ideology and acknowledges the risk for further radicalisation and mobilisation (Leuschner 2023; Brzuszkiewicz 2020, 15–16; Fielitz, Schwarz, and Quent 2022, 136–37). Interviewees 2 and 3 both stated that they interact in the forums to feel less lonely with their experiences, but they also indicated that they are not helpful and would push them to feel more depressed and nihilistic about their life.

In addition, both interview partners described the forum discourses and their participants as distant, cool, devoid of empathy and angry. Consistent exposure to incel ideology and discourses may potentially exacerbate social isolation and mental health issues, leading individuals to confront themselves permanently with their perceived deficiencies and traumas. This stands in contrast with the group-related motivations commonly observed in existing research on radicalisation. In other extremist contexts group members tend to collectively feel superior to others and define themselves based on this perceived superiority (Logvinov 2017, 75; Srowig et al. 2018, 663; Borum 2011, 21). Positive experiences within the reference group strengthen their identification, further reinforcing in-group cohesion and facilitating the radicalisation process (Meiering, Dziri, and Foroutan 2019, 99; Srowig et al. 2018, 661).

Future research should examine the development of individuals within the forums and derive process-orientated radicalisation models. Examining the interplay of risk factors is crucial to understanding how they mutually reinforce and evolve throughout the process and a prerequisite to identifying intervention pathways for this particular phenomenon. Without intending to place all incels under general suspicion, it should also be noted that these forums can serve as a breeding ground for so-called lone actor attackers (Winter and Spaaij 2021, 56; Leuschner 2023, 46). Hence, it holds significant importance for security authorities to diligently monitor online forums, while researchers should delve into exploring the interrelationships and mechanisms that perpetrators navigate when engaging in radical milieus.

In addition to the pertinent findings that are relevant to the research of extremism and radicalisation, the first interview partner’s case demonstrated that not all individuals who identify as incels are relevant target groups for interventions in the context of prevention and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). Individuals like him would benefit from gender-sensitive mental health counselling. It would be useful to conduct comparable interview studies that focus on the development of typologies in order to develop a differentiated terminology and to strengthen the nuanced understanding of the reasons for participation, attitudes, and currents within the incel subculture. While approaches from radicalisation research may offer explanations regarding the more radical and extremist currents, stigmatisation of this community in public discourses should be avoided to not further harm those individuals within the wider scene that feel connected to certain experiences, but clearly denounce any hateful or even extremist narration or action.

Concluding thoughts and recommendations

In consideration of the state of research on incels, this report theorises incel forums as radical milieus. The radical online milieus in which incels meet include different perspectives and opinions. On the one hand, members share their experiences and grievances; on the other hand, misogyny and endorsements of violence are propagated.

Existing studies on incel forums have shown that only a small part of incels approve of or advocate for violence (Moskalenko 2022a; Moskalenko 2022b; Whittaker 2024; Speckhard et al. 2021). Based on these findings, a definition of radicalisation was derived that does not conceptualise violence as a necessary endpoint of radicalisation, but rather regards radicalisation as the adoption of extreme positions that question the dignity of individuals or groups within societies (Abay Gaspar et al. 2020; Schuurmann 2020). The analysis revealed that the interview partners who identify themselves as incels interact in forums and represent radical and extreme positions including the justification of violence, misogynistic positions that dehumanise women and a closed world view that follows the premise that society structurally oppresses men and especially incels.

It can be concluded that the incel community is an ambivalent phenomenon that will challenge research on radicalisation and extremism in the future. On the one hand, the hateful discourse within closed forums poses a significant risk of spilling over into the offline world, potentially leading to acts of violence against women. On the other hand, the incel community and identity are inherently detrimental to its members, fostering a highly destructive environment. It appears to exacerbate mental health issues and may even serve as an ideological basis for suicide due to its nihilistic nature.

As a result, there is a pressing need for P/CVE initiatives and security authorities to address this phenomenon. Prevention and education should be key areas of focus to dissuade individuals from joining incel forums in the first place, where they are at risk to being exposed to extreme ideologies and discourses. Misogyny is a pressing issue in society, whereas extremist groups and politicians instrumentalise the topic for their own agenda. On social media, coaches such as the Tate brothers and pick-up artists are normalising misogynistic world views and desensitising young people. Through education, young people can gain resilience towards the narratives that often get portrayed as ‘scientific’ by representatives of the manosphere and incel forums. This can be done through positive gender-sensitive educational workshops and critical exchange with peers in schools and trough online learning possibilities. Empowering initiatives targeting young men specifically can help them reflect on masculine identities, work on an alternative positive self-image and develop skills that will support their social (re-)integration.

Currently, there is a lack of policies and programmes that effectively address the incel phenomenon at a practical level. More research is required to understand the specific needs of members of the incel community, with the primary aim of developing evidence-based P/CVE (Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism) interventions. Individuals within radical online environments are often socially isolated and difficult for practitioners to engage with, making outreach and initial contact challenging. To effectively reach incels, it is essential to provide support online, enabling initial engagement that can transition into long-term, offline interventions. Additionally, disengagement initiatives that are closely integrated with mental health counselling are urgently needed to tackle the unique nexus of severe mental health issues and radicalisation. International practice change and development of shared good practices should be supported by policy makers. The transnational nature of radical online milieus requires an agile approach and international cooperation between security authorities and the non-governmental sector in P/CVE; purely local or national initiatives will reach their limits when it comes to reaching individuals and transferring them to offline disengagement programmes.

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[1] This paper draws from the bachelor’s thesis Incels and Radicalization – Individuals as Incels? A Qualitative Content Analysis of Narrative Interviews with Individuals Identifying as Incels authored by Benedict Büchsenschütz, submitted at Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg in July 2023.

[2] Going ER in incel language refers to committing acts of violence. The phrase refers to Elliot Rodger’s 2014 mass shooting in Isla Vista, California. It signifies a violent response, particularly targeting women, due to perceived romantic and sexual frustration.

[3] In short, the ‘black pill theory’ is a pessimistic belief system within the incel community that emphasises genetic determinism and hopelessness regarding romantic and sexual relationships, often leading to feelings of resentment and sometimes justifying violence.

[4] A Likert scale is a survey tool measuring attitudes or opinions on a multi-point scale, usually ranging from 1 to 5 or 1 to 7, where lower points indicate disagreement and higher points indicate agreement.