By Thomas Mücke

In the context of disengagement work, civil society organisations have developed their own threat management. In cases where there is a risk, it is not only about endangering the public, but also about protecting oneself and others in the specific counselling situation. Those involved in prevention work often encounter people who, for example, have dysfunctional affect control and despair dynamics and are sometimes unable to control their emotions. This can repeatedly lead to dangerous situations. Here are some practical examples:

The counsellor is sitting with a client in the cafeteria of a train station. Suddenly, the client jumps up and runs angrily towards a passer-by. Quick action is required.

During a home visit, strangers suddenly and unexpectedly enter the apartment and block the exit.

During a counselling session, the client harasses the counsellor because of their hopeless perspective, since their actions do not lead to any improvement in their situation from their point of view. They threaten her with a weapon.

During a group training session in a prison, two participants get into a fight.

Actors from the extremist scene threaten the employees in an email.

These situations are not everyday occurrences for those working in extremism prevention. Prevention experts are usually well protected by their authentic and carefully developed working relationship with their clients and the high level of authorisation to intervene that goes with it. Nevertheless, threatening challenges do arise and place a high burden on a team.

Despite all the insecurity and helplessness that violent situations create, the question arises as to how dangerous situations and outbreaks of violence can be prevented through early recognition and intervention, and how appropriate consequences and lessons can be learned from the incidents following an escalation of violence. These are crucial questions for all professional groups involved in counselling.

De-escalation is an intervention behaviour with the sole objective of averting harm to employees, the parties to the conflict or the immediate environment. De-escalation means preventing or interrupting the direct exercise of violence, thus interrupting destructive processes to enable self-protection and protection of others and pave the way for constructive clarification. De-escalation cannot work as an individual method but is integrated into a security concept of the team and the respective organisation.

Protective de-escalation depends on the following questions:

· Which conflict should be de-escalated? Which person poses the greatest danger depending on the situation?

· How intense is the conflict? Which persons are (still) capable of acting?

What are the strengths and risks of the employees acting in the specific situation?

Which institutional conditions support or hinder the de-escalation process? What support options are available?

De-escalation over time

Escalations are a dynamic process, but de-escalation measures can also be roughly divided into different phases.

Phase 1: Preventive de-escalation and protective measures

Prevention means the early interruption of a harmful escalation process, for example through the following measures:

• Sensitisation to recognisable early warning signs (aggressive or depressed behaviour, changes in body language, facial expressions, etc.): Early intervention prevents a potentially harmful process. The warning signs can be expressed to different degrees. Sensitisation training helps the counsellor to classify the situation on this continuum.
• Taking tips seriously: Every tip about possible imminent violent acts is taken seriously and protective measures (up to and including police measures) are initiated.
• Preparation for conflict-intensive situations: preparatory measures, such as involving other employees, reduce the risk of having to act alone in threatening situations. But self-protection is also increased by property protection or the layout of the counselling rooms (creating an escape option).
• External assistance: Agreements are made with the police for specific dangerous situations for employees.

Phase 2: De-escalation in the specific situation

In this phase, all direct or indirect measures to stop violence take place; they depend on the person and the situation. Direct measures are all measures taken directly against the clientele, while indirect measures include, among other things, measures to quickly increase the level of support. The following principles are relevant here:

• Quick intervention must follow the principle of not endangering oneself.
  
• Early intervention increases the chances of intervention. If the initial escalation process is not met with deescalating reactions, the intensity of the escalation and the associated intentions to harm may intensify. A high level of conflict intensity – such as, among other things, the loss of control by the conflicting parties, the use of weapons, group dynamics that are prone to violence, planned acts of violence – makes possible de-escalation strategies more difficult and increases the risk for the intervening persons, who in these situations must ensure a safe retreat to a sufficient distance.
  
• De-escalation should not be reduced to the direct parties to the conflict but must also consider the indirectly involved persons, who can have an escalation-reinforcing effect.
  
• De-escalation always means first the spatial separation of the parties to the conflict – insofar as this is possible without self-endangerment. There must be sufficient distance between the parties to the conflict (usually separate rooms) until the emotional intensity has reduced. If a direct interaction process is still possible, e.g. through threatening gestures, insults, hostile eye contact, the escalation dynamic will continue.

• After the violent incident, it is important to ensure that the affected employees and other persons involved are emotionally supported through respectful treatment. This is initially done through direct emotional follow-up care by superiors. Further supportive measures, such as individual supervision, can also be offered.

Phase 3: Educational and institutional measures after de-escalation

Violent incidents initiate new learning processes for all parties involved when it is clarified what needs to be done to prevent possible repetitions of the violent escalation and which change processes are necessary for the actors to prevent further escalations. De-escalation is thus not only an ad-hoc intervention, but rather a long-term process involving learning and adaptation steps.

• The sequence of violence is evaluated with the perpetrators of violence and the question is raised as to what concrete alternatives to actual acts of violence exist. Demarcation measures and the termination of the working relationship (e.g. after a threat or an attack on employees) can also be a necessary consequence and should be considered.
  
• The dynamics of violence are analysed with the team. The aim is to make the team aware of the positive resources of the employees that have come into play during the de-escalation. Furthermore, alternatives to the specific de-escalation procedure can be discussed and tried out.
  
• The behaviour of persons not directly involved in the violent situation is discussed: To what extent did their behaviour have an escalating or de-escalating effect?

Ultimately, the question must also be asked as to whether the institution’s existing security concepts and the associated procedures in dangerous situations are adequate and helpful for current challenges, or whether they need to be adapted and further developed.

If the third phase of reappraisal is not carried out, there is a high probability of repeated escalation. In particular, the practices of the following institutional cultures can have a highly problematic effect here:

• The ‘image-oriented problem-concealment culture’ manifests itself in the trivialisation of violent incidents or the denial of any dangerous problem. The image of the institution should not be damaged. This attitude usually leads to an intensification of the problem.
  
• ‘Problem-shifting cultures’ feign institutional action to solve the problem. However, the problem and the responsibility are likely to be merely shifted and not dealt with – for example, by passing the case on to other institutions without explicit reference to the danger.
  
• A ‘culture of acceptance’ that views the awareness and behaviour of those seeking advice exclusively from their supposed ‘victim role’. Acts of aggression and violence are primarily explained by social discrimination and trivialised. The person seeking advice is released from their own responsibility and individual change processes can supposedly only be created through fundamental social change.
  
• The ‘last resort culture’ is the intensification of the acceptance culture and means that any behaviour that questions or distances oneself from the person seeking advice is seen as normatively wrong. One’s own work is seen as a last resort, because the counsellors assume that no one will take on this case if they distance themselves from the person.
  
• ‘Crowding out cultures’ leave those affected alone after a violent situation, also to avoid having to become aware of their own vulnerability. This allows them to evade their own responsibility. In most cases, the counsellors only become aware of the dangerousness of a situation after de-escalation. ‘What could have happened? Did I react correctly? What will the consequences be?’ When trying to answer these questions, the employees concerned need care and support. If they are left alone or critically questioned, this can lead to further harm to their person (secondary victimisation). Those affected may feel that they have failed or have not acted professionally. Meanwhile, the institution shirks its own responsibility.
  
• The ‘constraints culture’ refers to the inability of the institution to act, characterised by inadequate working conditions when dealing with difficult clients. Arguments such as a lack of personnel, inadequate security concepts, a lack of equipment (e.g. a missing telephone), a lack of support or a lack of opportunities for reflection are given here.

Using your own strengths – which intervention behaviour suits me?

Every de-escalation depends on the person executing it. Different people react very differently in similar situations and have their own individual wealth of experiences and resources. There is no generally valid de-escalation strategy. Rather, intervention options must be based on the strengths and limitations of the employees. Some personality-related intervention attitudes with corresponding options for action can be presented as a typology.

The offensive type intervenes directly in the event, if necessary, also physically. He has an immediate and quick reaction and can also physically show boundaries. This type gains the immediate attention of the parties in conflict, cannot be pushed back and thus remains capable of acting even at an advanced stage of escalation.

However, they can also overestimate themselves and be at high risk of endangering themselves. Possible intervention at an early stage can come across as pedagogically heteronomous and, under certain circumstances, escalations can even be intensified by rapid, aggressive physical intervention. In addition, the pedagogical view of the situation can be lost.

Possible interventions of this type are a verbal, loud separation or ‘deterrence’ through a certain, unambiguous appearance, as well as the physical separation of the conflicting parties according to the motto ‘create distance’.

The cautious type avoids direct confrontation with the violent event or the aggressor. He tries to withdraw from the conflict situation.

He takes a low risk of self-harm and is highly sensitive to early warning signs. This may give him time. Often, he sees flight as the only option. He may lose his pedagogical authority or the support of colleagues due to his caution, which may be perceived as hesitation or fear, and may be unable to intervene directly in the situation.

The distanced type does not enter the direct escalation. He takes a low risk of self-harm. He develops considered action strategies, takes a holistic view of the situation and involves external support to interrupt the escalation.

He asks a person who is still able to act to withdraw from the violent interaction, tries to get help from outside and asks uninvolved persons to get to a safe place.

In highly escalated situations, however, it may be impossible to separate the conflict parties from a distance.

In a violent situation, the incapacitated type (‘shock type’) remains in a kind of ‘shock-induced paralysis’. Even if they are willing to act, they remain incapable of acting.

They need opportunities to reflect and prepare interventions in advance, and to practice ‘small steps’ of de-escalation to become capable of acting in the medium term. Direct confrontation with the perpetrators of violence is overwhelming for them.

Nevertheless, indirect activities by the incapacitated type can also change a violent situation. One advantage of this type is that the freezing can protect against attacks due to the absence of stimulus factors. The disadvantage is that the lack of personal action means that there is no possibility of influencing the violent situation and protecting other persons involved.

Possible interventions include indirect de-escalation by appeasing the environment, reducing signals from other people that intensify the violence, changing external conditions, for example by switching on lights, or organising external help.

The communicative type tries to establish contact with the parties to the conflict through communicative strategies and to interrupt the escalation process by addressing the violent individuals.

Diversionary and delaying tactics, while simultaneously re-establishing a relationship with the violent individuals and demonstrating seriousness and interest, can be very effective in de-escalating the situation. Talking encourages people to pause and reflect.

The counsellor can generally attract attention first and convey their own point of view in a binding and explanatory manner. They should talk to the conflict party in a reassuring and non-provocative way, with moderate and defensive body language and maintain firm eye contact. At the same time, a discreet safe distance must be maintained from the person engaging in violence. It is problematic when a communicative intervention no longer reaches the person engaging in violence – for example, due to loss of control or drug use. In addition, there is a risk that the communication does not have a calming effect on the person but rather increases their agitation.

The ‘creative type’ tries to interrupt the violent behaviour of the person acting violently by using creative distraction strategies.

They create surprise effects through paradoxical interventions and thus the opportunity to stop the violence (e.g. an employee says to the two aggressive parties to the conflict: ‘You want to hit each other? Just a moment. I have to move the chairs so that you don’t hurt each other’). Paradoxical interventions must appear authentic, otherwise they are more likely to intensify the conflict.

Right to intervene

The schematisation of different ‘intervention types’ is intended to help develop a personal de-escalation strategy through resource orientation and authenticity. However, the intervention of counsellors in a destructive conflict dynamic depends not only on their personal strengths and limitations, but also on whether they are authorised to intervene at all. In this context, intervention authorisation means that educational staff are accepted by the persons involved in a conflict as interveners.

Intervention authorisation must be acquired. No one is automatically entitled to intervene based on their status or professional role. It is not an independent right, but is granted by the person to be counselled, must be constantly renewed and can be withdrawn in the event of abuse. The probability of an intervention justification increases if counsellors have created the basis for a trusting relationship with the persons concerned through continuous contact. This gives them credibility in critical situations and thus real chances of intervention. They can de-escalate through an unambiguous attitude and simultaneous multipartiality and fairness. De-escalation does not judge the conflict in general but tries to avert harm for those involved. If there is little justification for intervention, particular attention must be paid to self-protection.

Conclusion for educational practice

• Hazardous situations in the professional context must be taken seriously and addressed at all levels (employee, team, organisation, funding body). An internal safety concept and the development of binding procedures in moments of danger are indispensable for this.

• De-escalation measures must be taught and practised with a view to their practical application. Appropriate further training events must be developed and implemented as a mandatory qualification module within the organisation.

• Measures for the self-protection of employees have a high priority and must be constantly updated and further developed.

• Even with effective self-protection measures, it is important to ensure that there is no danger to the public (threat management).

Recommended reading:

The phase responses outlined in this article and the organisational typology are based on findings that were first recorded in 2000 and have been continuously developed over the years. See Korn, Judy and Thomas Mücke. 2011. Gewalt im Griff. Band 2: Deeskalations- und Mediationstraining. 3rd revised and updated edition, Weinheim and Basel: Beltz Verlag.

The typology of intervention behaviour is intended to serve as a guide for managers and was formulated for the first time for this article from practice for science.

Further reading:

von Berg, Annika, Thomas Mücke and Dennis Walkenhorst. 2022. The challenge of ‘high-risk individuals’. Opportunities and limits of cooperation between civil society and security authorities. Violence Prevention Network Series, Issue 9. Berlin

Rothkegel, Sibylle. 2021. Self-care and mental hygiene of counsellors in the context of selective and indicated extremism prevention. KN:IX Analysis #1. Berlin: Competence Network ‘Islamist Extremism’ (KN:IX).

This article has been published first in: Interventionen – Ausgabe 17, 2023