Disengagement work by civil society organisations in tertiary prevention

By Annika von Berg (Violence Prevention Network)

The text describes disengagement work in the context of tertiary prevention and addresses the challenge inherent in disengagement work of creating intrinsic motivation and a willingness to change on the part of clients. Which educational and social work approaches and concepts can disengagement work use to create this motivation, and what difficulties does it currently face?

Disengagement work is primarily a field of activity in education and social work. It developed from street work and accepting youth work, among other things, in which some of the actors who are now active in the field of Islamist extremism originally began their work with target groups from right-wing extremism. In addition to disengagement work, the term „exit support“ is also frequently used in the context of tertiary prevention. Although often used synonymously, both are indeed areas of tertiary extremism prevention, but with fundamentally different starting points.

Exit work is aimed at individuals who already have an intrinsic motivation to break away from extremist attitudes and groups. This motivation can be reinforced within the framework of counselling – for example, by supporting measures that serve to protect the individual, such as moving away from the extremist group. Disengagement work, on the other hand, must first create a space in which people are empowered to develop an intrinsic motivation to distance themselves from extremist attitudes, behaviours, actions, scenes and/or groups, i.e. a willingness to change. The explicit goal of disengagement work is to first establish this motivation and willingness to change, which involves creating a willingness among clients to engage in dialogue, question extremist attitudes, behaviour patterns and actions, leave them behind and (re)integrate into society.[i]

Exit work is not necessarily the „easier“ task, however, as it also involves dealing with challenging topics, both in terms of content and emotion. However, clients already have a fundamental willingness to do so, which is why the same educational and social work concepts are not required as in disengagement work, which aims to support willingness to change, personality and identity formation, and to create skills for self-determination and taking responsibility

[ii]Numerous actors are currently implementing exit work in Germany. However, only the following organisations are involved in disengagement work: Violence Prevention Network gGmbH (in various projects), the Turkish Community of Schleswig-Holstein e. V. with its „Kick-Off“ project, and Legato Bremen. Colleagues at the Salam counselling centre against Islamist radicalisation also work with individuals without intrinsic motivation, for example in the context of probation conditions, if they are willing to engage in dialogue (cf. Democracy Centre Rhineland-Palatinate, n.d.). In the area of right-wing extremism, there is currently the project „REE! Kurswechsel für Rechtsextremist*innen“ (REE! Change of course for right-wing extremists) by Violence Prevention Network gGmbH, which is explicitly aimed at people without intrinsic motivation. Exchange Brandenburg, PRISMA Saxony and Crossroads Berlin (all Violence Prevention Network gGmbH) as well as Distanz e. V. also work with individuals who lack motivation to distance themselves from right-wing extremism but who tend to have right-wing affinities and have not fully internalised right-wing extremist worldviews. [iii]

The following section will show why disengagement work is a field of social work and education. It will focus on Germany and the organisation of disengagement work there, explaining how it has developed historically, how it is justified and how it is structured today. It should be noted that distancing work in everyday counselling is a highly dynamic, non-linear process that can often involve setbacks. Distancing processes vary greatly and take time, especially when it comes to establishing a relationship for advising and working on the content.

Info box Disengagement work (idealised, schematic representation) 1. Case intake – The case is referred by a security authority because the person concerned has attracted attention through extremist behaviour that is not (yet) relevant under criminal law. The person concerned is offered cooperation or ordered to do so by a court. Or: – Relatives or the social environment of the person concerned contact those involved in disengagement work and establish contact between the person concerned and the disengagement workers. 2. Initial contact and establishment of relationship for advising – Counsellors contact the person concerned and explain the (legal) framework conditions for cooperation. If the person concerned is willing to cooperate – provided that the cooperation does not take place in a coercive context – the establishment of a trusting relationship begins. – The first phase of disengagement work also initiates intrinsic motivation to change, i.e. part of this phase is to create a fundamental willingness to open up and change. 3. Content-related work – Depending on the disengagement counsellor and the client’s needs, various methods and approaches are used to address individual factors and aspects – for example, reconstructing the client’s biography or coming to terms with a criminal offence in order to understand their own history of radicalisation; or classic social work content, such as integration into the job market or the education system. – Ideological content, such as enemy stereotypes and narratives, is also reflected upon. 4. Case closure – If the person concerned has distanced themselves from their extremist attitudes and behaviour and there is no further need for support that falls within the scope of disengagement work, the case can be closed.

Good practice in Germany
At the international level, such as in the context of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (2011-2024), academics and practitioners are calling for stronger civil society structures, similar to those in Germany (Papp et al. 2022: 33). The European Commission (2021) also emphasises the importance of cooperation between state and civil society actors in disengagement work. In France, the need for long-term support from appropriate organisations was recognised and the original approach, which was exclusively security-focused, was revised. It was determined that distancing programmes that go beyond imprisonment and probation were necessary. To this end, a partnership between two NGOs and the central prison administration has been in place in France since 2018 (Papp 2022: 10f.).

The first civil society exit programmes, whose methods and content also influence today’s disengagement work, developed in the 1990s in the Scandinavian countries in response to the increasing popularity of right-wing extremist groups and organisations among young people (Papp et al. 2022: 7). Since the 1990s, Germany has been characterised by a model of exit support and disengagement work that is predominantly shaped by civil society. The founders of the first NGOs in the field of exit support and disengagement work in Germany, such as Exit Germany in 2000, also drew on this experience in working with young right-wing extremists (as accepting youth work) (Papp et al. 2022: 8).

Overall, the P/CVE landscape in Germany is characterised by a particularly broad regional structure and methodological and institutional diversity, in which a large number of civil society actors have been successfully operating and cooperating for years. There are several reasons why Germany places a strong focus on NGOs as the implementing actors in disengagement work. For example, there is a growing awareness that dealing with (presumed) extremist attitudes and restricting freedom of expression requires a high degree of sensitivity, and that NGOs enjoy greater trust than security authorities, especially among individuals who are critical of the system. In addition, the consequences drawn from Germany’s experience with authoritarianism and totalitarianism also play a role here (Baaken et al. 2020: 8).

Work in the prison context in Germany is also unique in Europe.  Counselling for incarcerated criminals and/or violent offenders with extremist attitudes and/or behaviour patterns is mostly carried out by external civil society actors working in education and social work. There are a variety of methods used, such as the systemic approach, psychotherapeutic methods and client-centred counselling.

New challenges
Those involved in disengagement work in Germany are currently facing new challenges. Firstly, there are funding cuts and austerity measures: if project funding for civil society organisations is reduced or completely cut, this makes it more difficult to provide (long-term) support to clients, and in some cases, support may be discontinued and clients may lose – possibly at a critical point in the disengagement process, which can lead to or contribute not only to instability for the clients, but also to re-radicalisation and thus to an increased risk for and from the radicalised/radicalisation-prone person.

Equally challenging is the increasing social support for far-right parties. This complicates the work of disengagement in terms of content – on the one hand, because the increasing „social acceptability“ of right-wing ideas means that clients increasingly feel understood and supported by mainstream society in their attitudes. On the other hand, this development reinforces the narrative of a far-right threat in other areas, e.g. in the context of Islamism. It can also be assumed that the electoral success of right-wing parties will have an impact on funding for civil society projects. In this context, there have also been numerous attempts to delegitimise and threaten civil society engagement.

The digital sphere also poses a challenge for disengagement work, as educational practice must increasingly focus on the online lives of clients.[iv] For counsellors, this means that opportunities for dialogue with those (presumed) to be at risk of radicalisation must also be implemented on social media platforms such as TikTok and Instagram. It is essential that the necessary conditions and structures are created for effective online counselling. In the spirit of „outreach online prevention“, viable strategies and resources must be in place to enable (potentially) radicalised individuals and those at risk of radicalisation to be approached online. In addition, it must be possible to transition to an offline counselling setting or a protected online setting. To this end, the necessary online infrastructure must

• be in place and known to the target group,
• be secure in terms of data protection so that those affected and counsellors can communicate without third parties having access,
• be staffed flexibly in terms of time with appropriate human resources and
• be adapted to the digital usage behaviour of the target group (e.g. through responsive design and consideration of trends).

At the same time, outreach online work requires professionals trained in education and social work who have the necessary knowledge, skills and experience to build relationships and trust. Especially in the online context, where relationships and contacts are broken more quickly, it is essential to proceed sensitively and methodically in order to reach the target groups despite difficult conditions and integrate them into longer-term counselling contexts.

It is also necessary to continuously monitor extremist online activities in order to identify changes in the scene and be able to respond to them in the counselling process. The KN:IX plus information service (KN:IX – Competence Network „Islamist Extremism“), for example, has already gathered comprehensive findings in this area. Framework conditions and standards for successful online prevention, as developed by the Federal Working Group on Religiously Motivated Extremism (BAG RelEx)[v] , are another important building block. The Streetwork@Online project (AVP e. V.) is also the first initiative to focus exclusively on online prevention.

Another challenge lies in working with individuals who can no longer be clearly assigned to a specific phenomenon. This applies, for example, to misogynistic attitudes that legitimise violence, which are combined with various ideological elements and cannot be clearly assigned to a classic phenomenon. Supporters of conspiracy ideologies or the “Reichsbürger” movement (citizen of the German Reich) also represent new, difficult-to-reach target groups for disengagement work. This highlights the need to expand educational and social work services to include cross-phenomenon approaches. And because they fundamentally reject the political system, it can be assumed, particularly in the case of conspiracy ideologists and “Reichsbürger”, that state authorities will not gain access and that civil society actors will have a greater chance of working with these target groups.

A plea for civil society and cooperative approaches
Civil society organisations can step in where government agencies lack access or resources. This access also allows for a more flexible approach that goes beyond a purely security-oriented one (Baaken et al. 2020: 9). Services provided by civil society actors also enable long-term and comprehensive support, thus promising sustainability. Clients can be supported not only in prison or during probation, but also outside these institutional and legal frameworks. In addition, the concepts of disengagement work provide for long-term support, meaning that individuals are not only supported for a specific period of time or until a specific security authority event (end of probation, end of supervision), but until they are stabilised from an educational/social work perspective and possible vulnerabilities for re-radicalisation have been identified. Furthermore, due to their working methods, civil society counsellors can provide particularly intensive support to their clients when necessary and in critical phases (such as the transition from imprisonment to release and reintegration into society)[vi]. State or security agency actors usually do not have the opportunity to accompany radicalised individuals or extremist offenders over a longer period of time once they are no longer a security risk. However, support is also necessary after imprisonment in order to stabilise the individual in the long term and to be available as a contact person should crises or vulnerabilities arise again that could lead to re-radicalisation.

As already indicated, disengagement work is characterised by supporting people who (1) are more difficult to access and (2) do not yet have an intrinsic motivation to change. Those targeted by disengagement work often have little interest in engaging with someone who questions their own attitudes and decisions or who is diametrically opposed to their extremist values. Initially, those targeted see no advantage in participating in a disengagement measure. Accordingly, relationship building and trust building are essential to initiate a willingness to change. This relationship building requires not only a special attitude and an authentic demeanour, but also considerable time resources and, above all, educational methods. In addition, educators and social workers employed by NGOs are distinguished by the fact that they are not perceived as representatives of state structures. The independence of the organisations to which these professionals belong increases their credibility and trustworthiness in the eyes of the target group, as well as the legitimacy of their work (Papp et al. 2022: 33).

„Building trusting relationships with hard-to-reach target groups is a specific achievement of social work and can be confidently claimed by the profession itself. The experience that social education workers have now gained in prevention and disengagement work provides a solid basis for confident professional positioning.“ (Figlestahler/Schau 2021)

Nevertheless, in many cases, security concerns remain that may well indicate the need for security authorities to examine and process cases. However, clients often have disbelieves about (security) authorities and other government agencies. In addition, (security) authorities have a mandate to reduce risk to society and prosecute criminal offences (Figlestahler/Scheu 2021), which often runs counter to the interests of clients and can hinder the building of trust. So if the work assignments of the (security) authorities and the difficult relationship between the recipients of disengagement work and representatives of state systems make this work difficult for state agencies, (event-related) cooperation between educational/social work actors and (security) authorities is absolutely essential. In some cases, it even makes sense to closely coordinate police and educational/social work measures. However, in recent years, increasing concern has been expressed that the dependencies inherent in such cooperative relationships could lead to a restriction of the autonomy of civil society actors. This could result in clear role boundaries and relationships becoming blurred and social work/educational objectives being subordinated to security-oriented goals (cf. Schuhmacher 2018, KN:IX 2020: 73).

Knowing that such collaborative relationships always involve challenges and must be critically reflected upon, certain basic requirements should be met to ensure that cooperation functions well both in the overall context and during case development: clear understanding and boundaries of roles are necessary, as well as knowledge and understanding of the working logic of the respective partner. Similarly, such (event-related) cooperation must allow room for criticism, even if the (security) authorities and civil society organisations are in a relationship of financial dependency. Only in this way is it possible to critically question the proportionality of police, intelligence or immigration measures, or to reflect on educational work and its impact.

In order to guarantee the best possible and sustainable support for those involved in distancing and disengagement processes, their implementation should remain the responsibility of civil society, social work and educational actors. In many cases, cooperation with (security) authorities is necessary due to security concerns. It is important to define mutual basic requirements so that the necessary autonomy of civil society actors can be guaranteed and maintained.

The author:
Annika von Berg is a political scientist and sociologist. She has been working in various areas at Violence Prevention Network since 2018 and conducts research on topics such as disengagement processes, risk assessment, social diagnostics and lone terrorist perpetrators.

This article has first been published in KN:IX Report 2024.

Literature

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[i]  For a differentiation between exit work and disengagement work, see Exit Germany (2024); Meixner/Wiechmann (2024); Distanz.Info 2024 and Pisoiu (2020: 2) based on Ryan and Deci, (2000).

[ii] The following list of organisations is based on their membership in the advisory network of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) advisory centre on radicalisation and on an evaluation of the network partners listed online: https://www.beratungsstelle-radikalisierung.de/DE/Unser-Netzwerk/unsernetzwerk_node.html (as of 8 April 2024).

[iii] Based on a list from the portal: https://infoportal.komprex.de/search (as of 8 April 2024).

[iv] See the results of the DISLEX 3D project by modus|zad – Centre for Applied Deradicalisation Research (Modus | ZAD, project duration 2019-2022).

[v] The following organisations (projects) were involved in developing the standards: AVP e. V. (Local Streetwork On/Off, streetwork@online, CEOPS), IFAK e. V. (ExPO – Extremism Prevention Online), RE/init e. V. (Wegweiser im Vest), Stuttgarter Jugendhaus gGmbH (Zukunftswelten), ufuq e. V., Vereinigung Pestalozzi gGmbH (Legato. Specialist and counselling centre for religiously motivated radicalisation), Violence Prevention Network gGmbH and Kaleido Ostbelgien (Wegweiser Ostbelgien).

[vi] See also the highlight from the KN:IX Report 2023 by Thomas Mücke and Franziska Kreller (Mücke/Kreller 2023).