Radicalisation in the Shadow of the Pandemic: New Challenges for Secondary Prevention

By Benedict Büchsenschütz (Violence Prevention Network)

The COVID-19 pandemic was far more than a global health crisis; it acted as a major catalyst for social polarisation and individual processes of radicalisation. For adolescents and young adults in particular, the period of lockdowns constituted a “perfect storm” that significantly increased susceptibility to extremist narratives (Basu 2020, cited in Whittaker 2026). Practitioners of secondary prevention in Germany and elsewhere are now observing the long-term consequences of this period, which has had a lasting impact on the nature of extremism.

The “Perfect Storm”: Isolation and digital vulnerability

During the pandemic, young people experienced profound social isolation as a result of school closures and the loss of stable daily routines. This isolation intensified feelings of alienation, loneliness, and psychological stress (Espenschied 2023). In this vulnerable context, the internet served not only as a refuge but also as a largely unregulated space in which extremist actors could operate. As young people spent significantly more time online – often without supervision – the risk of exposure to conspiracy-driven or extremist content increased markedly (Whittaker 2026).

Extremist groups actively exploited this crisis by presenting their narratives as explanatory frameworks for the perceived chaos. The pandemic functioned as a “critical juncture” at which uncertainty could be transformed into hostility towards institutions (Desai 2021, cited in Whittaker 2026). Social media platforms played a central role in this process, acting as reference groups that fulfilled needs for belonging and identity during a time of physical distancing (Espenschied 2023).

Hybridisation and “Salad Bar Extremism”

A key finding from recent analyses within the German prevention landscape is the transformation of extremist worldviews. Rather than adhering to closed, monolithic ideologies, practitioners increasingly observe processes of hybridisation and fragmentation (Brinkmöller et al. 2025).

The concept of “salad bar extremism” (Rousseau et al. 2024, cited in Brinkmöller et al. 2025) describes how young people construct personalised belief systems by selectively combining ideological elements from different sources. These may include far-right extremism, conspiracy ideologies, and religiously framed extremism. Bridging narratives – such as antifeminism, antisemitism, or general hostility towards science – serve as connective elements between previously distinct ideological spheres (Brinkmöller et al. 2025).

This development is further amplified by the “gamification” and “memefication” of violence. Through humorous memes and transgressive online subcultures, extremist content is normalised and made more accessible to wider audiences (Lakhani & Wiedlitzka 2023, cited in Espenschied 2023). For secondary prevention, this creates a significant challenge: clients can no longer be easily assigned to clearly defined ideological categories, as boundaries between them become increasingly blurred (Brinkmöller et al. 2025).

Contemporary implications: A younger target group

Reports from counselling practice, including those from Violence Prevention Network, highlight a concerning trend: the target group in secondary prevention is becoming increasingly younger. Practitioners report growing numbers of cases involving individuals aged 14 to 18, with some enquiries extending even into primary school age (Brinkmöller et al. 2025).

These young individuals are often not seeking complex political ideologies but rather identity, recognition, and an outlet for frustration (Brinkmöller et al. 2025). The pandemic has left a gap in psychosocial support that has, in part, been filled by extremist actors. In regions with weaker social infrastructures – such as parts of eastern Germany – far-right groups have even assumed roles as informal “social service providers”, thereby contributing to the normalisation of their ideology in the everyday lives of young people (Brinkmöller et al. 2025).

Conclusion: Prevention under structural pressure

Today, we face the challenge that processes of radicalisation are potentially faster, more digital, and less predictable than they were in the last decade. The effects of pandemic-induced isolation continue to shape the political socialisation of “Generation Z” (Brinkmöller et al. 2025).

However, the most significant obstacle to effective prevention is structural in nature. A large proportion of Germany’s prevention landscape is funded through the federal programme Demokratie leben! (Brinkmöller et al. 2025). Current transitions between funding periods, potential budget cuts, and uncertainty regarding the continuation of established projects pose serious challenges for extremism prevention:

  • Loss of continuity: Effective disengagement work depends on long-term relationship-building. When projects end due to expiring funding, established trust with vulnerable young people is lost (Brinkmöller et al. 2025).
  • Shortage of skilled professionals: Precarious funding conditions make the field less attractive for qualified practitioners, despite the growing need for specialised expertise.
  • Lack of flexibility: A prevention system that operates from one funding cycle to the next is ill-equipped to respond sustainably to dynamic developments such as ideological hybridisation.

To effectively address the long-term consequences of pandemic-related radicalisation, Germany requires a stable and legally anchored prevention infrastructure. Only under such conditions can secondary prevention adequately respond to the fragmented realities of radicalised young people – both now and in the future.

Author:

Benedikt Büchsenschütz is a Research Fellow at Violence Prevention Network, with a focus on gender in extremism, (online) radicalisation, and hybrid ideologies. He holds a master’s degree in Crisis and Security Management: Governance of Radicalism, Extremism and Terrorism (MSc) from Leiden University.

Literature:

Booth, E., Lee, J., Rizoiu, M. & Farid, H. (2024) Conspiracy, Misinformation, Radicalisation: Understanding the online pathway to indoctrination and opportunities for intervention, Sydney: University of Technology.

Brinkmöller, N., Büchsenschütz, B. & Kreisel, L. (2025) Hybridisierung, Fragmentierung, Individualisierung – Extremistische Ideologien im Wandel?, Violence Prevention Network Schriftenreihe Heft 15, Berlin: Violence Prevention Network. https://violence-prevention-network.de/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/Violence-Prevention-Network-Publication-Series-15-1.pdf (accessed on 31 March 2026)

Espenschied, M. (2023) The radicalisation of youth: The contagion of ideologically motivated violent extremism throughout COVID-19, Thesis, Macquarie University.

Whittaker, J. (2026) Online Radicalization During the Covid Pandemic, in: The Routledge Handbook of Online Radicalization, London: Routledge