Strategic Communication in P/CV: Existing Trends and Future Directions

By Team Communication (Violence Prevention Network)

Introduction

Strategic communication is an important component in preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). The growth of digital communication environments has enabled extremist actors to disseminate narratives, mobilise supporters, and recruit across geographic boundaries. Consequently, for almost a decade now researchers view violent extremism as a communicative as well as a security challenge (Jones 2020, Whittaker and Elsayed 2019).

Recent practitioner assessments further suggest that the strategic communication environment is becoming increasingly complex due to disinformation campaigns, foreign information manipulation, hybrid threats, cyber operations, and the malicious use of artificial intelligence. The EU Knowledge Hub Strategic Communications Meeting concluded that radicalisation processes are increasingly accelerated through digital ecosystems, particularly among younger audiences using gaming, niche, and ephemeral platforms. Consequently, strategic communication efforts are required to become more adaptive, agile, and collaborative across governmental, civil society, academic, and private-sector actors (EU Knowledge Hub 2025).

Governments, international organisations, and civil society actors have responded by investing in communication-based interventions, including counter-narratives, alternative narratives, online campaigns, and resilience-building initiatives. However, a growing body of research suggests that significant uncertainties remain regarding the effectiveness and evaluation of these approaches (Treacy et al. 2024, Jones 2020).

Counter-narratives alone are insufficient

One of the most consistent findings is that communication campaigns are unlikely to succeed when implemented in isolation. Studies of P/CVE interventions indicate that communication activities tend to be more effective when integrated with broader social, educational, and community-based prevention measures (ibid.). “Over the past decade counter-messaging campaigns have become a central plank of CVE programming globally, with support from policy makers and practitioners for further funding and implementation (Reed et al., 2017). However, the evidence base for such campaigns remains limited (Ferguson, 2016).” (Treacy et al. 2024)

Similarly, Jones (2020) concludes that communication initiatives demonstrate greater potential when embedded within wider interventions that address the social and psychological drivers of radicalisation. These findings suggest that strategic communication should be understood as one part of a comprehensive prevention framework rather than as a stand-alone solution.

Credibility matters more than institutional visibility

A second major trend concerns the importance of the information provider’s credibility. Researchers consistently emphasise that audiences often respond more positively to trusted individuals and organisations than to official government communication alone. Credibility, authenticity, and social proximity appear to be critical determinants of persuasive effectiveness (Lamphere-Englund and Vugteveen 2021).

Lamphere-Englund and Vugteveen (2021) argue that strategic communication should begin with audience analysis and segmentation to identify trusted voices within specific communities. Their work highlights the need for evidence-based targeting and message development informed by behavioural insights.

Likewise, Jones (2020) identifies messenger selection and messenger credibility among the most promising areas for improving future P/CVE communication efforts. These findings support a shift away from centrally controlled messaging toward approaches that empower credible community actors, educators, peers, and other trusted intermediaries.

Practitioners repeatedly emphasised that community-led narratives and local messengers remain essential because audiences respond more positively to actors perceived as authentic, culturally grounded, and trustworthy. Community leaders, religious figures, local journalists, parents, former extremists, and civil society representatives were identified as particularly effective communicators in environments where government actors may lack legitimacy or social proximity (EU Knowledge Hub 2025).

Audience segmentation is essential

Recent research demonstrates that effective strategic communication requires a nuanced understanding of target audiences. Earlier approaches often treated vulnerable populations as homogeneous groups, whereas contemporary scholarship emphasises audience differentiation and behavioural segmentation. (Treacy et al. 2024)

According to Lamphere-Englund and Vugteveen (2021), resilience-oriented audience segmentation may provide a more constructive basis for intervention design than approaches focused exclusively on vulnerability and risk. Their report recommends adapting lessons from public health campaigns and counter-disinformation initiatives, both of which rely heavily on rigorous audience research and message testing.

Recent operational experiences from the Global Coalition against Daesh further reinforce the importance of audience segmentation. Campaign designers highlighted the need to identify distinct audience groups and tailor communication products to local cultural, religious, and social realities. Rather than disseminating generic messages broadly, successful campaigns increasingly rely on highly targeted messaging strategies informed by continuous audience research and behavioural analysis (EU Knowledge Hub 2025).

Positive alternative narratives are gaining prominence

Another important trend is a movement away from exclusively adversarial counter-narratives towards positive alternative narratives. Rather than directly contesting extremist claims, alternative narratives seek to promote belonging, civic engagement, resilience, and positive social identities (Carthy et al. 2020, van Zyl 2020). The systematic review conducted by Carthy et al. (2020) suggests that narrative-based interventions hold promise, although the evidence base remains limited and requires further development. Similarly, van Zyl (2020) recommends combining communication campaigns with positive narratives, opportunities for social participation, and psychosocial support mechanisms.

Research shows that many existing campaigns focus heavily on exposing the atrocities committed by extremist groups while devoting less attention to presenting compelling positive alternatives (Whittaker and Elsayed 2019). These findings indicate that future communication efforts may benefit from emphasising positive identities and pathways for social inclusion alongside efforts to challenge extremist messaging.

Recent practitioner discussions also suggest that effective communications should avoid unintentionally amplifying extremist narratives or brands. Rather than repeating extremist claims in the process of refutation, campaigns increasingly employ indirect storytelling approaches that promote alternative values such as community safety, family unity, social cohesion, and long-term stability. Positive value-based messaging often resonates more strongly than direct counter-argumentation (EU Knowledge Hub 2025).

Strategic communication must address emotional and identity-based drivers

Emerging evidence suggests that effective strategic communication requires engagement with the emotional and identity-related dimensions of radicalisation. Experts participating in the EU Knowledge Hub Strategic Communications Meeting observed that extremist actors frequently succeed because they offer emotionally compelling narratives that provide identity, belonging, purpose, and simple explanations for complex societal challenges. Consequently, communication initiatives that rely exclusively on factual corrections or rational counterarguments may have limited impact. Instead, future campaigns may benefit from incorporating emotional resonance, positive identity formation, and belonging-focused narratives into prevention strategies (EU Knowledge Hub 2025).

Evidence-based evaluation remains limited

A persistent concern within the literature is the lack of rigorous evaluation mechanisms. Many communication campaigns report indicators such as impressions, views, shares, and engagement rates, but comparatively few studies measure changes in attitudes, intentions, or behaviours associated with radicalisation. Treacy et al. (2024) therefore note that empirical evidence concerning the effectiveness of communication interventions remains relatively limited.

Recent operational evaluation frameworks also demonstrate the limitations of relying exclusively on digital engagement metrics. Practitioners increasingly advocate mixed-method evaluation models that combine reach and engagement measurements with qualitative research, exposure-versus-control designs, sentiment analysis, and assessment of adversary reactions. Evidence presented by the Global Coalition against Daesh suggests that high engagement levels do not necessarily correspond with measurable attitudinal change, further highlighting the need for more sophisticated evaluation methodologies (EU Knowledge Hub 2025).

Likewise, Jones (2020) identifies methodological shortcomings in the evaluation of P/CVE communications and calls for stronger evidence frameworks capable of assessing long-term outcomes. As a result, researchers increasingly advocate for longitudinal studies, experimental designs, and standardised approaches to impact assessment.

Research gaps and future directions

Despite significant advances in the field, several important research gaps persist.

Lack of longitudinal evidence

Most studies focus on immediate responses to messages rather than their long-term effects. Additional longitudinal research is needed to determine whether communication interventions contribute to sustained reductions in radicalisation risk over time (Treacy et al. 2024, Jones 2020).

Insufficient behavioural outcome measures

Existing evaluations frequently rely on digital engagement metrics and self-reported attitudes. Future studies should examine behavioural outcomes, including disengagement from extremist networks and reduced support for violence (Carthy et al. 2020, Treacy et al. 2024).

Limited audience research

Although audience segmentation has become increasingly prominent, more empirical research is needed to understand how different populations respond to distinct communication approaches. Age, gender, cultural and/or religious context, and ideological background remain underexplored variables (Lamphere-Englund and Vugteveen 2021, Treacy et al. 2024).

Need for comparative effectiveness studies

Few studies directly compare alternative narratives, counter-narratives, media literacy interventions, inoculation strategies, and dialogue-based approaches. Comparative research would provide clearer evidence regarding which techniques are most effective under specific conditions (Carthy et al. 2020, Jones 2020).

Geographic imbalance in the evidence base

The landscape remains dominated by studies from Europe and North America. More research is required across Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Latin America to assess the transferability of existing strategic communication models (Hasani Pllana 2021, van Zyl 2021, GCTF 2026).

Emerging technologies and artificial intelligence

Much of the existing literature predates both widespread adoption of generative artificial intelligence and its systematic exploitation by extremist actors. Recent practitioner evidence indicates that the malicious use of AI is already an operational reality, enabling scalable propaganda production, personalised targeting, manipulation, grooming, and disinformation activities at unprecedented speed and volume. Future research should therefore examine how AI-mediated information environments, recommendation systems, deepfakes, and automated content generation affect both extremist mobilisation and P/CVE communication strategies (Chalk 2024; EU Knowledge Hub 2025).

Since AI-generated (visual) content is currently widespread, it is hardly surprising that extremist actors are also making use of it. Images created using AI enable extremist actors to visualise content quickly, cost-effectively and professionally. This makes it easier for them to give the impression of being a significant movement.

“Furthermore, AI allows for the vivid representation of extremist narratives. It makes it easier for these actors to translate abstract and sweeping ideas into visual form, for example by stereotyping vague enemy stereotypes. On the one hand, this captures users’ attention and encourages interaction with the content. On the other hand, it conveys a mental image in a more vivid, lively and compelling way. AI can therefore be used to establish desired fictions as realities.” (dist[ex] monitor 2026)

Youth vulnerability and emerging digital platforms

Recent evidence suggests that radicalisation pathways among younger audiences are increasingly occurring within gaming environments, niche online communities, and ephemeral digital platforms that remain underrepresented in existing research. The growing importance of these environments highlights the need for further investigation into platform-specific communication dynamics, youth media consumption patterns, and prevention approaches capable of operating effectively within rapidly changing digital ecosystems (EU Knowledge Hub 2025).

Agility and adaptive campaigning

Last, but not least, another emerging theme in recent practitioner discussions is the need to move beyond traditional campaign models toward continuous communication processes. Effective strategic communication should operate through iterative “scan-test-adapt” cycles that continuously monitor changes in the information environment, test narrative interventions, and adjust messaging based on observed audience responses. This approach reflects the increasingly dynamic nature of radicalisation processes and highlights the need for flexible campaign structures capable of responding rapidly to emerging threats and opportunities (EU Knowledge Hub 2025).

List of references

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Chalk, R. (2024). A Strategic Communications Approach to Tackling Current, Emerging and New Violent Extremist Threats in Europe. International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. https://doi.org/10.19165/20241361 (last accessed 7 October 2026).

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Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) (2026). Employing strategic communications to prevent and counter violent extremism conducive to terrorism in East Africa. https://www.thegctf.org/What-we-do/News/ArtMID/705/ArticleID/331/Employing-strategic-communications-to-prevent-and-counter-violent-extremism-conducive-to-terrorism-in-East-Africa (last accessed 27 October 2026).

Hasani Pllana, M. (2021). Strategic Communication and Prevention of Violent Extremism through Education: The Case of Kosovo. Journal of Educational and Social Research, 11(2), 106-117. https://doi.org/10.36941/jesr-2021-0034 (last accessed 7 October 2026).

Jones, M. (2020). Through the Looking Glass: Assessing the Evidence Base for P/CVE Communications. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). https://static.rusi.org/pcve_communications_final_web_version.pdf (last accessed 7 October 2026).

Lamphere-Englund, G., & Vugteveen, M. (2021). Understanding Strategic Communications for P/CVE: Audience Segmentation and Message Testing Approaches. European Commission Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN). https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2023-02/RANPS_Stratcomms_Consolidated_Audience%20segmentation_ICCT.pdf (last accessed 7 October 2026) .

Treacy, S., Reed, A., & Glazzard, A. (2024). A Systematic Integrative Review of Counter-Messaging Communication Campaigns Targeting Terrorism or Violent Extremism. Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression. https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2024.2419390 (last accessed 7 October 2026).

Whittaker, J., & Elsayed, L. (2019). Linkages as a Lens: An Exploration of Strategic Communications in P/CVE. Journal for Deradicalization, 20. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Joe-Whittaker-2/publication/336362632_Linkages_as_a_Lens_An_Exploration_of_Strategic_Communications_in_PCVE/links/5d9d857592851c2f70f73052/Linkages-as-a-Lens-An-Exploration-of-Strategic-Communications-in-P-CVE.pdf (last accessed 7 October 2026).

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