By Thomas Mücke (Violence Prevention Network)

This article was first published in German in: Interventionen – Zeitschrift für Verantwortungspädagogik Nr. 20, 2026

Over the past 20 years, Violence Prevention Network has developed a professional and effective action plan for tertiary prevention in Germany, enabling prevention practitioners to take effective action even when dealing with high-risk cases. Intensive and continuous cooperation between counselling services, security authorities and academia is a key factor in the success of this approach. Deradicalisation and disengagement work, as a socio-educational approach, has become increasingly professionalised, partly through

• a binding and structured collaboration with the security authorities,
• a transfer of knowledge between practice and academia, which has led, amongst other things, to the restructuring of case management and the introduction of a comprehensive diagnostic tool adapted to the context of extremism (GRIDD PRO – Social Diagnostics) as well as a dedicated threat management system,
• the expansion of the integration system into, amongst other areas, the healthcare system (particularly in the field of psychotherapy),
• the strengthening of impact analysis.

During this period, Violence Prevention Network sought and further developed cooperation with the security authorities in the respective federal states, thereby achieving the following sustainable results for the benefit of clients and the protection of the public:

• Access routes were expanded. Through this cooperation, individuals known to the security authorities could be proactively approached. This enabled client relationships to be established and processes of distancing to be initiated among individuals who would otherwise have been subject exclusively to repressive measures by the security authorities.
• State institutions and judicial authorities have, among other things through judicial orders, facilitated cooperation between counsellors and clients and fostered a willingness to change among the individuals concerned.
• Non-state actors involved in distancing work enjoy a ‘trust bonus’ and are, on the one hand, better able to foster openness and, on the other, can usefully complement existing state measures — such as probation services — which are limited in both duration and scope. This has enabled clients to receive needs-based, long-term and sustainable support; and, thanks to the multi-professional nature of non-state actors, to be supported competently and in a way that is relevant to their everyday lives across numerous areas of life.
• The security authorities accept and support the clients’ processes of distancing and (re-)integration.
• Situations and processes posing a risk were identified and addressed at an early stage to reduce the risk of harm to oneself and others. This was achieved both through a supplementary risk analysis by the security authorities and through a specially developed, socio-educational risk management approach implemented by civil society actors.

The impact of this collaboration can also be seen in the recidivism figures from Violence Prevention Network. In the area of Islamism alone, in the context of risk-related incidents, we had collaborated with the security authorities on 408 cases by 2024 (including 69 high-risk individuals and 61 returnees from Syria). There were only two relapses involving extremist acts and violent crimes against persons, corresponding to a relapse rate of 0.49%.

The potential for successful cooperation was realised by ensuring that, despite the differences among the stakeholders in terms of objectives, professional backgrounds and measures, the respective strengths were prioritised, professional and ethical boundaries were respected, and binding working structures were established. Case-specific cooperation was structured in a binding manner that reduces the exchange of information to the aspects necessary to protect the personal rights of the individuals concerned. Clear rules were agreed upon regarding the sharing of information, specifying what must be shared and where the non-negotiable limits of information sharing lie on both sides.

Combined, this has thus created a structure for complementary work in risk-relevant case contexts. This complex structure enables both optimal case management and the safeguarding of the individual rights of the clients concerned, as well as the simultaneous enforcement of the very legitimate public interest in risk prevention. Partly on the basis of these experiences, the Federal Ministry of the Interior’s Task Force on the Prevention of Islamism called for the following in its Recommendation for Action No. 12 in May 2025:

“Establishing and expanding robust multi-professional structures for the assessment and handling of cases of radicalisation (or suspected radicalisation) as part of a case management framework under the responsibility of security authorities and other state and civil society actors

To combat radicalisation and Islamism effectively, a smooth and efficient exchange of information between security authorities and other state and civil society actors is required. In view of current trends and developments in the field of Islamism, and particularly in the area of online radicalisation, it is necessary to review existing workflows within the framework of tertiary prevention between security authorities (SA) and state and civil society prevention actors, and to adapt them where necessary. Furthermore, the growing complexity of the phenomenon requires the establishment of tailored and efficient workflows to enable a timely and targeted response to radicalising tendencies, particularly in the digital sphere. Only in this way can successful prevention and intervention be guaranteed. We recommend creating, establishing and expanding specialised contact points within the security authorities that act as interfaces between the authorities and civil society. These points should serve as central hubs for the collection and analysis of information and facilitate communication between the various actors.”

Cooperation between civil society organisations and security authorities is a central component of prevention work in Germany and enables both the civil society and socio-educational perspective in prevention work and the societal duty of protection to be optimised.

Author:

Thomas Mücke, a qualified educator and political scientist, is co-founder and managing director of Violence Prevention Network. In his work with young people, he attaches great importance to treating them with respect and without humiliation. This approach gives him access to young people at-risk, which is crucial to the success of youth work.

Further reading:

Armborst, Andreas; Moussa Nabo, Mitra; Nehlsen, Inga; Ullrich, Simone (2019). Evaluation criteria for the prevention of Islamism. National Centre for Crime Prevention.

Bannenberg, Britta (2019). Lone-wolf terrorists in Germany – possibilities for early detection. In: Lehmann, Jens; Lüttig, Frank (eds.). The fight against terror in the present and future, pp. 259-281. Nomos. Baden-Baden.

Berg, Annika von; Korn, Judy; Mücke, Thomas; Walkenhorst, Dennis (2019). Assessment and evaluation of risks in the context of extremism prevention and deradicalisation. Between security policy ‘risk assessment’ and educational ‘resilience assessment’, Violence Prevention Network Series – Issue 2.

Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2021) (ed.). Deradicalisation and Distancing Work. Companion Book to the Qualification Course on (Environmental) Counselling in the Field of Islamist-Motivated Extremism. Contributions to Migration and Integration, Volume 9. Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. Nuremberg.

Handle, Julia; Mücke, Thomas (2021). Threat management. Dealing with high-risk clients in targeted prevention. KNIX Report 2021, pp. 83-91. Violence Prevention Network.

Logvinov, Michail (2020). Risk Assessment of the Likelihood of Extremist Violence. A Guide. Forum on Crime Prevention 2/2020.

Task Force on the Prevention of Islamism of the Federal Ministry of the Interior (2025). Recommendations for Action by the Task Force on the Prevention of Islamism – Preventing Radicalisation in an Age of Social Uncertainty. Federal Ministry of the Interior.